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Introduction 
“We are no longer fearful of their intervention… They [the Chinese] have no air 
force.  Now that we have bases for our Air Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get 
down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter.” 
  
 – General Douglas MacArthur, October 15, 19501   
 
The above comment reflected the assumption that US air power would suffice to 
deter the Chinese from crossing the North Korean border.  Experiencing endless 
successes since the Inchon Landing on September 15, 1950, MacArthur was confident 
that his army could easily defeat a technologically deficient enemy.  Yet as the allied 
armies approached the Sino-Korean border, roughly 200,000 soldiers of the People’s 
Volunteer Army (PVA) intervened in late October of 1950 and pushed the UN and South 
Korean forces into full retreat back below the 38
th
 Parallel.  A modern army possessing 
air superiority was not invincible against outside attacks.   
By the end of the Second World War, America possessed a superior air force and 
integrated technology as part of its military strategy.  US air power and the bombing of 
cities were developed, perfected, and utilized to bring Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan 
to their knees.  This success led to the creation of the US Air Force (USAF) as an 
independent branch from the Army, which suggested that military and political leaders 
acknowledged not only the advantages of air power but also the “American way of war”: 
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 General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of UN forces during the Korean War, to President 
Truman during the Wake Island Conference on October 15, 1950, in Harry Truman, Douglas 
MacArthur, Omar Bradley, “Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island 
Conference,” October 15, 1950, 
<trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-9-
4.pdf#zoom=100> (accessed September 10, 2013) (hereafter cited as WIC). 
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a military strategy emphasizing on finesse, sophistication, and efficiency in the post-war 
world.  However, during the Korean War, the US unexpectedly struggled to handle the 
complex challenges in regional conflicts.  This thesis will examine these complexities by 
understanding how and why there was a discrepancy between popular belief in the 
superior capability of air power and the USAF’s actual performance against the Chinese.   
Although various scholars have studied and analyzed the Korean War, the most 
important works can be categorized into three distinct yet overlapping camps: 1) 
politically and ideologically biased narratives of the war; 2) self-criticisms of America’s 
military and its foreign policy; and 3) examinations of operational issues within the 
military.   
Within the first camp, there are some authors who favorably see the US 
involvement in Korea.  More importantly, however, a good number of scholars have been 
harshly critical of US military action in Asia.  Bruce Cumings and Cullen MacDonald are 
two of the most notable authors who believe that Washington’s Cold War policies pushed 
the US into an unnecessary conflict with the communists.  Cumings asserts that the term, 
“limited war,” is actually a gross understatement in describing the conflict in Korea.  He 
illustrates how Koreans were victims of Cold War imperialism by revealing brutal 
atrocities committed by US forces as well as their North Korean counterparts.  He also 
argues that the Korean War rather than the Second World War actually “turned the 
United States into the policeman of the world.”2  MacDonald adds to Cumings’s work as 
he exposes the suffering of the average Korean peasant when he points out that the 
“advancing army [US Army] adopted a racist attitude towards Koreans which [had] been 
evident from the earliest days of the conflict” leading to “‘gook syndrome,’ the arrogant 
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 Bruce Cumings, The Korean War: A History (New York: Modern Library, 2010), 243. 
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misjudgment of Asians.”3  Both authors portray Korea as a victim of superpower 
meddling while arguing that China’s intervention was the first of many obstacles to 
America’s interest in expanding its influence in Asia.  The Chinese counterattack is 
considered a logical and just response to US neo-imperialism. Therefore, Cummings and 
MacDonald have been criticized for having a communist bias and are labeled as being 
part of the “anti-American” camp.   
The second and by far the largest body of scholarship contains mostly American 
scholars who are self-critical of America’s military performance as well as its political 
decisions pertaining to the Korean War.  Virtually all of these scholars admire the skill, 
audacity, and ingenuity displayed by the Chinese as the PVA attempted to overcome its 
technological inadequacies.  However, historians begin to diverge into different schools 
of thought in examining American military performance, the Truman Administration, and 
other US institutions.  Rosemary Foot and Bevin Alexander are critical of both the US 
military and the Truman Administration as they examine the micro details of war 
management as well as the bigger picture of Cold War politics.  Foot mainly criticizes US 
policy for its “inability to perceive the situation from the Chinese perspective”4 and for 
the way it “displayed a predilection for action over discussion, for boldness over caution, 
for glorifying strength and denigrating weakness.”5  She then explains why the US 
ultimately struggled to understand the “thinness of the dividing line between limited and 
expanded conflict.”6  Alexander, however, views the conflict as a contest of two national 
                                                 
3
 Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War Before Vietnam (New York: The Free Press: A Division of 
Macmillan, Inc., 1988), 209-211. 
4
 Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1985), 82. 
5
 Foot, The Wrong War, 240. 
6 Ibid., 37. 
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wills that collide in two smaller, completely separate wars: the first with North Korea; the 
second with Communist China.
7
  He believes that all parties are to blame as “MacArthur 
was wrong about Chinese intervention, but no more wrong than the top American 
leadership,… the President of the United States” in predicting and reacting to the Chinese 
threat.
8
   
Regarding the actions of the Truman Administration, a number of historians are at 
odds with one another.  On the one hand, David Halberstam, in The Coldest Winter, 
points out “[t]hat America’s [war] aims were not clearly defined, and that there were 
significant differences in the attitudes in Washington and Tokyo, had been obvious from 
the very start.”9  He criticizes policymakers in Washington for allowing the Chinese to 
successfully intervene and drive the UN forces out of North Korea, but places the 
majority of the blame on General MacArthur.  Halberstam believes that “Of the 
American military miscalculations of the twentieth century, Douglas MacArthur’s 
decision to send his troops all the way to the Yalu stands alone.” 10  He then argues that 
MacArthur’s own ego and unbending faith in American airpower were more damaging to 
the UN forces than external players such as the Truman Administration and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.  On the other hand, Burton I. Kaufman and D. Clayton James heavily 
criticize the Truman Administration for America’s failure to unite the Korean Peninsula.  
Kaufman argues that the Truman Administration “often failed to appreciate the military 
consequences of its political decisions, with the result that seemingly contradictory orders 
                                                 
7
 Alexander Bevin, Korea: The First War We Lost (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1986), ix. 
8
 Bevin, Korea, 248. 
9
 David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War (New York: Hyperion, 2007), 369. 
10
 Halberstam, The Coldest Winter, 369. 
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were sometimes given to MacArthur….”11  While Kaufman believes that poor executive 
leadership and divided politics at home forced MacArthur to choose bad decisions, James 
strongly argues that the US’s experience in World War II influenced how the war in 
Korea was fought.  In addition, James asserts that the Truman Administration, from the 
beginning, purposefully set up the UN commander as a potential scapegoat by arranging 
the Wake Island Conference
12
 in case the situation in Korea deteriorated.
13
  Though he 
acknowledges MacArthur’s idiosyncrasies as a factor for losing UN gains north of the 
38
th
 Parallel, James charges the Truman Administration with abrupt inconsistency by 
pointing out that “the objectives of the Unites States in Korea changed at least four 
times” during MacArthur’s command.14  Both authors, however, believe that the 
unpredictable variables that arise during military operations are not given enough 
appreciation. 
T.R. Fehrenbach and Dominic Tierney are among the few historians who consider 
America’s cultural values and civilian control over the military as the reasons for the 
US’s disappointing results in Korea.  Fehrenbach boldly states that American liberal 
society is incompatible with realities of the soldier and that “…liberal society, in its heart, 
wants not only domination of the military, but acquiescence of the military toward the 
liberal view of life.”15  Such disconnection between American civilian and military 
values, Fehrenbach argues, negatively affected US military performance during the Cold 
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 Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1986), 355. 
12
 The Wake Island Conference was the first meeting between President Truman and General Douglas 
MacArthur to discuss the progress of the Korean War.  The Conference is mainly known for MacArthur 
assuring the president that the Chinese will not intervene in the Korean War. 
13
 D. Clayton James and Anne Sharp Wells, Refighting The Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea, 
1950-1953 (New York: The Free Press: A Division of Macmillan, Inc., 1993), 44. 
14
 James, Refighting The Last War, 25. 
15
 T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study of Unpreparedness (New York: Pocket Books, INC, 1964), 
457. 
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War.  Tierney follows a similar argument as Fehrenbach’s but attributes the poor results 
in Korea to the US’s deviating from its “crusader tradition.”16  He believes that unlike 
past overseas conflicts, the US, for the first time, was “not employing all necessary force” 
in defeating its opponent.
17
  The idea of “limited war” did not fit with the American 
culture of rallying around and fighting in the defense of cultural and religious values.  In 
essence, this second group of historians question America’s overall preparedness to carry 
out its increased global military responsibilities.  They believe that the US stumbled in its 
first regional conflict because of unexpected political and military shortcomings mixed 
with clashing domestic and foreign expectations. 
The third and final camp consists of military historians who attempt to shed light 
on the operational issues faced by the US military and expose the tribulations 
experienced by the individual soldier.  The military historian, Roy Appleman, is 
universally respected for his work, South To The Naktong, North To The Yalu, which 
describes the war’s military operations on a theatre level and provides a trove of 
information on night-time and cold weather warfare.  Russell A. Gugeler’s Combat 
Actions in Korea and S.L.A. Marshall’s The River and the Gauntlet present the personal 
experiences of the fighting in Korea.  Both of their works are chronological and contain 
more personal anecdotes of American and allied soldiers instead of focusing on the 
overall strategic or geopolitical situation at the time.  
Robert F. Futrell and Eduard Mark offer the most valuable secondary information 
to understanding the USAF’s role and its impact during the war.  As a military airpower 
historian, Futrell’s The United States Air Force In Korea 1950-1953 has an obvious bias 
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 Dominic Tierney, How We Fight: Crusades, Quagmires, and the American Way of War (New York: 
Little, Brown and Company, 2010), 169. 
17
 Tierney, How We Fight, 169. 
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as he further outlines in detail about how air power attempted to win the war alone.  His 
work plays down the successful efforts of the Chinese while boosting the influence of air 
power on the outcome of the war and the USAF’s enormous military contribution.  
Although he admits to the shortcomings of air power, Futrell states, “FEAF [Far East Air 
Force] ‘owned’ the air to the Yalu, but here air superiority ended… because of United 
Nations Command politico-military restriction” further hinting that it was American 
policy that ultimately destined the USAF to fail in preventing Chinese successes.
18
  
However, Mark’s piece counters Futrell’s claim by arguing that the Air Force’s impact is 
actually inflated.  While acknowledging the advantages offered by air power, Mark 
insists “that FEAF failed to achieve not only its maximal objective… but also the lesser 
goal of rendering the Communists incapable of offensive action” due to the prowess of 
the Chinese and the failings and difficulties faced by the USAF in Korea.
19
    
Although a great number of scholars have written about and shed enormous 
insight on the war, there are still unanswered questions.  Why did US policymakers 
consider air power such an attractive solution for its military interventions in foreign 
countries?  Did air power actually escalate rather than diffuse the hostilities between 
China and the US?  What is the significance of air power, and more broadly, technology 
in relation to the larger debates on how the US decides its level of military interventions 
in foreign countries? 
Questions like these are not unique to the Korean War but are still relevant in our 
time.  This thesis will contribute to the existing literature by presenting a framework 
                                                 
18
 Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force In Korea 1950-1953 (Washington D.C.: Office of Air 
Force History, 1983), 694. 
19
 Eduard Mark, Aerial Interdiction in Three Wars (Washington D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1994), 
317. 
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through which to analyze how and why technological advantages were not sufficient in 
consolidating and defending US gains during the Korean War.  More specifically, I will 
argue that US military technology alone failed to prevent Chinese successes because of 
three interrelated factors: technology, politics, and the will to make necessary sacrifices.  
This thesis will analyze the interrelationships of these three factors in order to understand 
how their dynamics conflicted or cooperated with one another.  Furthermore, by 
examining why the US aerial bombing effort failed to prevent China’s counterattack, the 
framework will attempt to explain how and why this particular air campaign during the 
Korean War is a clear example of the challenges the US faces when it involves itself in 
subsequent regional conflicts.  Finally, the thesis will highlight the dangers of a 
technologically driven military strategy and dispel any illusion that waging war is easy 
and straightforward. 
My primary sources consist of periodical clippings from an online database 
containing the New York Times to see how US officials tried to portray the progress of the 
war to the American public and to identify certain repeated themes the US military issued 
to the press.  I then use the periodicals to compare and contrast the US and allied 
assessments of the impending Chinese threat.  These assessments will consist of archival 
research involving a large number of declassified State Department, National Security 
Council (NSC), and CIA documents from the Truman Library and the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars.  The reports and discussions from various leaders 
within the Truman Administration will provide considerable insight on how Cold War 
political realities and the ways in which American culture influenced the rationale behind 
their confidence in air power and in responding to the Chinese threat.  Additional sources 
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will include an analysis of the US Army’s The Big Picture film series, which can assist in 
addressing American cultural expectations towards waging war.  Then excerpts from the 
memoirs of South Korea’s first four-star general, Paik Sun Yup, will provide a much 
needed Korean perspective on its alliance with the US and how the South Koreans came 
to the conclusion that the PVA were operating in northern Korea.  Secondary sources 
contextualize the situation from October 1950 to February 1951; they also provide maps 
and statistics to help elucidate the role and effectiveness of the US Air Force. 
  The thesis begins by taking a critical look at the merits and shortcomings of air 
power and the paradoxical effects of military technology, the political quandary the 
Truman Administration faced, and China’s asymmetrical response to neutralize a 
technologically superior opponent.  The thesis refines the definitions of “technology,” 
“politics,” and “will,” and analyzes the outcome of the air campaign as viewed from this 
three-factor perspective.  Finally, the thesis addresses the inherent complexities of 
regional conflicts and their ramifications on US military commitments around the world. 
  
10 
 
President Truman Boxed In 
By 1950, post-war America symbolized production and industrial efficiency as 
well as freedom and democracy.  The characteristics of the US military were aligned with 
American values as they also celebrated individualism while emphasizing on industrial-
like efficiency of minimum input and maximum output.  The US possessed a modern, 
mechanized military that created a number of options for the government when deciding 
whether to become involved in a regional conflict.
20
 
When the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) invaded the South in June 25, 
1950, the US was completely caught off guard because Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
had deemed it clear to exclude South Korea from the US Pacific Defense Line.  President 
Truman hastily ordered General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Occupation 
of Japan, to deploy available troops into the Korean Peninsula.  However, a substantial 
number of men and supplies of materiel could not be shipped across the Sea of Japan and 
sent to the frontlines on short notice.  Thus, air power acted as a quick reaction force that 
could stall the NKPA until stronger defenses could be set up. 
By early July, the army defenses of the Republic of Korea (ROK) had rapidly 
deteriorated and were falling back to southeast Korea.  Task Force Smith, a contingent of 
US soldiers who were originally sent to bolster the South’s defense, found itself ill 
prepared against the North Koreans, many of whom were former anti-colonialists against 
the Japanese.  It looked like the ROK was going to suffer the same fate as the Chinese 
Nationalists.  When it became evident that MacArthur’s large occupation force of about 
50,000 men in Japan could not halt the North Korean advance, President Truman 
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 Michael S. Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States Since the 1930s, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1995). 
11 
 
recognized that he could not ask able-bodied Americans to take up arms and die for an 
obscure country in East Asia.
21
  With the fall of Republican China to Mao Zedong’s 
communists one year earlier, the Truman Administration found itself in a political 
impasse by 1950.  As a new-found superpower, the US found itself shouldering the bulk 
of responsibility after the Second World War, primarily through stabilizing war-torn 
nations by providing a political and economic bulwark against communism.  The 
American public also demanded that the Administration be tough on communism.   But 
then Truman had to tend to domestic concerns and fulfill his constituents’ expectations 
by demobilizing military divisions, bringing soldiers back home and adjusting them to 
civilian life, and lifting wartime restrictions as soon as possible.  In the end, he could not 
fully separate the domestic and international interests because the latter was a subset to 
the former. 
The Korean War tested the inherent contradictions of the Administration’s 
policies—stopping the spread of communism and concurrently catering to domestic 
needs—towards regional conflicts.  To evaluate Truman’s dilemma and subsequent 
decisions, this thesis develops an integrated framework of three factors or analytical 
viewpoints: (1) the will to spend national resources; (2) military technology, more 
specifically, air power; and (3) politics.  This thesis will refer to these three factors using 
the keywords “will,” “technology,” and “politics.”  And each keyword has dual 
attributes: the will to spend money or lives; the promise or peril of technology; and 
domestic or international politics.  This essay focuses on one particular campaign during 
the Korean War because it is one of the best examples on how these factors are 
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intertwined in that one factor reinforces or negates the effects of another factor.  It then 
analyzes the campaign by employing three pair-wise factors: will/technology; 
will/politics; and politics/technology.  
13 
 
Will and Technology 
At the outbreak of the Korean War, the Truman Administration faced the all-too-
familiar dilemma—spending money or lives—for handling a foreign regional conflict.  
As the strongest economy in the world, the US possessed enough power to fund various 
programs to defend against communism.  But it could not ask its people to sacrifice lives 
for expensive foreign adventures.   Spending money was more convenient for the US to 
exercise its hegemonic influence around the world.  Furthermore, the choice became 
easier because its strong industrial economy focused on creating technology. 
Increasing defense spending became more important than ever with the 
development of aircrafts and nuclear bombs, the technologies that allowed the US to 
project its power to the far corners of the world.  The sheer distance between the US and 
Korea made the investment in aircraft even more relevant.  Out of various military 
technologies, air power became a vital one that could quickly respond to crises and 
protect American interests whereas mobilizing ground forces would take enormous 
amounts of time and money.  By relying on military technology, prominently air power, 
to fight a foreign war, the Truman Administration could keep the war popular at home, 
utilize the industrial strength of the United States, and pursue the policy of 
“containment,” its strategy for fighting the Cold War with the Soviet Union. 
The promise of technology 
Unlike its Chinese opponents, the American government did not have a problem 
of supplying their troops with the necessary weapons and heavy equipment despite 
cutting defense spending after 1945.  In fact, as recommended by National Security 
14 
 
Council Paper NSC-68
22
, the Truman Administration increased its defense budget in 
response to the conflict in Korea.  America’s main advantage over its opponents was its 
robust economic strength.  In contrast to its enemies as well as its allies, the American 
economy was virtually untouched and even thrived during the Second World War.  
Government officials realized that specialization, automation, and the assembly line 
produced more weapons, supplies, and ammunition faster than the opponent could 
destroy them.  Armed with its robust economy, the US military bought the idea of 
applying the industrial production and technological efficiency to military affairs; and it 
wholeheartedly embraced the doctrine of “Mobility of firepower is the key to victory,” 
which means that pure firepower could overwhelm an opposing army regardless of its 
numbers.  The doctrine had many ramifications:  the will to spend money on industrial 
production could be the ultimate factor in winning a war; investment in military 
technology would reduce the necessity of mobilizing the entire populace and mitigating 
the disadvantages of limited troop involvement.  The promise of military technology, 
especially air power, was so alluring in that it could stay away from messy human 
businesses—families, political opinions, language barriers, or cultural differences.  Air 
power was essentially a military version of liquid capital that provided the perfect outlet 
for a nation not willing to sacrifice bodies in the name of defending the free world. 
The strong faith in military technology can be best evidenced by The Big Picture, 
a television series program funded by the US Army.  Its broadcast began in the early 
stages of the Cold War.  The program intended to inform the American public of the 
latest military weaponry and the heroic deeds by US armed forces.  Although this 
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particular episode, The Army Combat Team, aired in 1951, The Big Picture focused on 
the US regimental combat team and emphasized the dynamic fighting force that 
developed within the US armed forces since World War II.  The film starts out with a 
display of various US military personnel who are dispatched around the world “to defend 
our nation, you the American people, against aggression” and thereby establishing that 
America lives in a dangerous world of ideological conflict.
 23
  The host, Captain Carl 
Zimmerman, explains the capabilities of the army combat team and its performance in 
Korea.  The narrative underscores two themes: inter-branch cooperation and the central 
idea that firepower will triumph against manpower.  The voice of the narrator tries to 
show the American public “the world’s greatest fighting team—the American Army 
combat team, a tough and mobile assault force which can hit anywhere, anytime,” which 
supports the notion that the US armed forces were omniscient and omnipotent in the post-
war world.  The narrator goes on to suggest that the US Army has evolved beyond the 
traditional methods of waging war via manpower.
24
  With a particular emphasis on 
industrial efficiency, the US military asserts that the American method of waging war is 
now “firepower, teamwork, and mobility… to do any size job in the shortest time and 
with the fewest casualties possible.” 
The film quickly cuts to a short scene of the Russian Red Army marching on 
parade in Red Square.  The narrator announces how “other armies commit vast 
manpower resources to battle and rely on man’s expendability.”  This scene shows that 
America had a technologically superior military, and it portrays the communist military 
as an organization that possesses no human sympathy towards its own soldiers.  The 
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following scene intends to differentiate the US military from its foes by showing how the 
army combat team adopted the method of employing firepower to achieve maximum 
effectiveness in destroying the enemy.  The film completely disregards the high 
probability of civilian casualties that often comes with this combat technique.  The 
narrator goes on to delineate the weapons that provide the firepower by going beyond the 
traditional infantryman, and he introduces “tanks, artillery, and planes of the Air Force.”  
The narrator includes the words, “Air Force” as homage to the newly recognized, 
independent branch of the US armed forces after World War II.  He continues: when the 
army combat team faces a more difficult task, the answer to enemy opposition is greater 
firepower.  If the infantryman cannot do the job, the tank brings in heavier firepower.  
And if armor is not enough, the combat team reverts to the power of artillery, which then 
relies on air power to finish the task.   
Another recurring theme of The Big Picture is inter-branch cooperation: 
Everything is coordinated smoothly and without a glitch.  The display of military 
technology combined with examples of engineering feats paints an idealized picture of 
American values and way of life.  Although industrial efficiency and individualism may 
be seemingly contradicting, the emphasis on “teamwork” and “mobility of firepower” 
goes beyond the battlefield doctrine and suggests a new dynamic in that technological 
development can fuse collectivism and individualism.  The Big Picture exploits American 
popular culture (e.g., recreational competition) and the ‘go-getter’ spirit to help reconcile 
these contradictory concepts.  In an attempt to connect with its viewers at home, 
Zimmerman compares the dynamics of the army combat team to those of an American 
football team.  A scene depicts American tanks and soldiers moving forward as the 
17 
 
narrator talks about how the “tanks and infantrymen fight together as a team, making up 
for each other’s shortcomings… By fire and movement, our army advances.”25 
 
 
Map 1 
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 "The Army Combat Team," 1951 episode of The Big Picture 
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(Map 1 will assist our understanding of event discussed in this thesis.  It shows the 
progress of the UN advance in a six week time period starting from the NKPA rout in 
September 15, 1950 to US and ROK troops reaching the Yalu River.
26
) 
The successes of air power during Naktong Bulge (July-August, 1950) 
 The defenses along the Naktong River protected Busan, the last major deep water 
port in South Korea.  Despite initial struggles and defeats, the ROK and US troops 
contained breakthroughs along their defense line and successfully resisted against the 
NKPA offensive.  Air power immensely contributed to the ROK and US victory because 
of its numerous advantages, which further persuaded the Truman Administration to opt 
for spending dollars over bodies.  The most notable capabilities of air power were 
interdiction, Close Air Support (CAS), resupply, and evacuation: these leveled the 
playing field for US and UN troops during the beginning months of the Korean War. 
The first capability of air power was interdiction.  Interdiction was officially seen 
as an aerial tactic where fighter-bombers would attack enemy supply lines and bivouacs 
to cut off supplies of materiel for an advancing army.  The Far East Air Force (FEAF) 
interdiction campaigns ranged in scale from a minor strafing by a single fighter-bomber 
to a massive air campaign involving hundreds of bombers dropping thousands of tons of 
ordinance on bridges and cities.  The purpose of interdiction was to “isolate the 
battlefield” using bombers, weaken the enemy’s offensive capabilities, and provide 
decisive advantages for friendly ground troops.
27
  Air power interdiction brought such 
notable successes during the Battle of Naktong River: it blunted the NKPA offensive 
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despite the UN having fewer soldiers; it severely disrupted North Korean logistics to 
prevent supplies from arriving at the frontlines in adequate quantities; and it utilized 
psychological warfare to demoralize the enemy, which could clearly be seen in 
September 1950.  According to historian Eduard Mark, between June 25, 1950 and 
November 1, 1950, 148 out of 825 captured North Korean soldiers (17.9%) cited that the 
fear of aircraft (second to shortage of food) was the reason for their low morale.
28
 
Close Air Support (CAS) was another vital component to the US military and 
certainly was a key factor in the UN’s survival against the NKPA advance in the summer 
of 1950.  Virtually uncontested in the air, FEAF provided significant assistance to UN 
forces in their defense of the Busan perimeter.  (Map 1 shows the dire situation of UN 
and ROK military as they only maintained less than 10% of the Korean peninsula.  With 
the perimeter getting smaller by the day, it looked as if MacArthur’s forces would be 
driven into the sea.)  For example, the renowned Korean War historian Roy Appleman 
described an incident when FEAF discovered a large North Korean convoy immobile: it 
“rushed every available plane to the scene… in a massive air strike.  Observers of the 
strike reported that it destroyed 38 tanks, 7 half-track vehicles, 117 trucks, and large 
number of enemy soldiers.”29  Despite the exaggerated numbers, this example displayed 
just how air power could deliver a high rate of firepower from the air onto enemy ground 
forces.  
CAS also played a critical role in providing extra fire support for friendly ground 
troops along the mountainous terrain of Korea.  During the war, it took about forty 
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minutes for FEAF to arrive on the battlefield from when ground troops requested CAS.
30
  
Access to such aviation marvels and witnessing the destruction inflicted on the enemy 
further reinforced the military’s commitment to spending money.  For the Truman 
Administration, spending dollars on technology was a more convenient military policy 
than enormously investing in clothes, supplies, training, and transporting a soldier for a 
relatively minor regional conflict in East Asia.   
With the successful defense at Busan and the amphibious assault at Inchon, the 
fortunes of war began to turn in favor for the UN and ROK forces in September of 1950.  
The once desperate and beleaguered UN army transformed itself into a mechanized 
fighting force that chased the routed NKPA northward at such speed that ground logistics 
had trouble keeping up.  However, General MacArthur believed that “he could not supply 
both Eighth Army
31
 and X Corps from Inch’on for a quick continuation of the pursuit 
north.”32  Unless he captured another deep water port in North Korea, MacArthur had to 
overcome three challenges: distance, geography, and high consumption.  Inchon and 
Busan were the only developed deep-water harbors in the southern half of Korea that 
could bring in troops and supplies.  Any rapid advance would have eventually come to a 
grinding halt, as the logistical capabilities of the military would be overstretched.  The 
second problem was that Korea was an undeveloped country with very few roads that 
could sustain heavy transport.  While some roads only existed on maps, others were mere 
goat paths.  The last problem was that a modern, Western army consumes elephantine 
amounts of food, medical supplies, ammunition, and gasoline.  
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Air power again came to the rescue by offering its logistical capabilities, which 
sustained the speedy advance of UN ground forces.  Air transports—e.g., the C-119 
Flying Boxcar, the Douglas C-124 Globemaster II, and the newly developed helicopter—
allowed the US and UN forces to send supplies to advancing troop columns that were 
racing on the few roads that led to the 38
th
 Parallel.  According to the New York Times, 
official statistics state, “Combat Cargo Command… flying 307 sorties, lifted 1,589 tons 
of essential cargo”33 while “aircraft continued to airlift more than 1,000 tons of cargo 
daily into Korea.”34  By looking at these numbers alone, it is evident that the Army 
depended on these channels of supplies to continue its rapid advance.  Such capabilities 
were essential especially in Korea because the few, dilapidated roads put enormous 
logistical strain on feeding the Army.     
The peril of technology after UN Troops Cross the 38
th
 Parallel (October 1950) 
Along with the immense promise of military technology, air power had its dark 
side and had paradoxical effects: (1) engendering complacency, (2) fostering inter-branch 
competition, (3) underestimating China’s will to spend bodies, (4) breeding cultural and 
historical ignorance, and (5) leading to a perverse practice of quantifying warfare.  These 
unexpected aspects of America’s technological supremacy were slowly revealed as the 
UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel and raced northward under an umbrella of the US air 
cover. 
Increasing Complacency 
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On Oct. 15, 1950, MacArthur met with President Truman on Wake Island and 
assured him that the Chinese were not a threat to UN forces in North Korea.  When the 
President inquired about the “chances for Chinese or Soviet interference…,” MacArthur 
confidently replied, “[v]ery little… We are no longer fearful of their intervention.  The 
Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria… Only 50/60,000 could have gotten across the 
Yalu River.  They have no Air Force… if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang 
[sic] there would be the greatest slaughter.”35 MacArthur was not alone in advancing this 
argument; in fact, complacent sentiments began to permeate the American ranks after 
months of endless victories.  The majority in the US military organization in Korea 
disregarded the basic infantry strategy carelessly while ignoring the evidence of 
substantial Chinese presence in North Korea. 
The US troops were so eager to push north that they completely disregarded 
Korea’s geographic terrain.  As mentioned earlier, Korea was an underdeveloped country 
that possessed very few quality roads and contained “the northern Taebaek Range [rose] 
to rugged heights… The principal routes of travel follow the deep mountain valleys in a 
generally north-south direction.”36  Thus, the road-bound vehicles that were responsible 
for the UN’s rapid advance lost its effectiveness on the ground.  Carl von Clausewitz, the 
famous Prussian military strategist, also stressed on the dangers as well as opportunities 
during an offensive on a mountainous area.  He states, “an army on the offensive… 
would consider itself extraordinarily lucky to find that the enemy had not occupied a 
mountain range between them” but if he did,  
“…he [the enemy] is no longer in doubt about the route the attacker is 
taking; and the latter has not been able to choose his roads with the 
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enemy’s position in mind… 1. Mountains… do not allow one to diverge 
from the road and split… as the needs of the moment may require… The 
advance, therefore, should proceed on several roads from the start or, 
better still, be made on a somewhat broader front.”37   
 
The major consequence of such blatant disregard for basic infantry tactics was 
that the enemy possessed a major advantage on the ground.  Vehicles driving on the 
poorly kept roads not only alerted the enemy of a unit’s location, but also made a unit’s 
movement very predictable.  Appleman perfectly describes how the advance of the 
Eighth Army toward the Yalu River went against Clausewitz’s advice as its attack lacked 
coordination and “resembled a series of rapier thrusts of individual units along roads that 
promised the swiftest penetration… Each [column] was free to advance as fast and as far 
as it could, without considering the gains (or problems) of the others.”38  There was no 
way to discover potential ambushes or ensure an effective defense from them.  The best 
case study that could accurately demonstrate the consequences of military carelessness is 
the Battle of Unsan, which will be addressed in a later section in the thesis. 
Inter-branch competition 
Before the Korean War, the air force technically did not have its own independent 
branch.  Fighters and bombers belonged to either the Army or the Navy.  However, after 
its contributions to the war effort during the Second World War, including the successful 
efforts to drop the atomic bomb, Washington felt that it was necessary to create an 
independent branch for its own airplanes, the United States Air Force (USAF).  Its 
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advocates such as Major General Curtis E. LeMay were eager to prove to their peers and 
superiors that air power alone could win a war.
39
  
 The formation of the USAF created a number of problems within the armed 
forces community.  Although the army and navy in the US military had always vied for 
funding from Washington, the two branches never felt the need to compete over who 
destroyed the enemy because there was a definitive line of military responsibility.  
Logically, the navy had jurisdiction on the sea while the army had complete control on 
land.  Both branches would cooperate when the situation involved both parties.  How did 
the air force fit in this balance?  Air power could cross over land and sea.  Air power had 
obviously displayed a versatile role in combat.  But was there anything unique air power 
alone could bring to the table?   
During the Korean War, the USAF was expected to carry out its responsibilities 
by following an army-dominated war doctrine.  General Headquarters was dominated by 
Army staff and lacked equal representation from the other branches.
40
  Obviously, USAF 
commanders such as General Stratemeyer were apprehensive about auxiliary roles within 
the greater war effort.  According to Futrell, “MacArthur’s staff was telling FEAF how to 
conduct its air operations” all the way from Tokyo creating rising resentment from 
Stratemeyer toward MacArthur’s HQ.41   Army commanders such as General Edward M. 
Almond believed that FEAF should have more of a supporting role for his troops on the 
ground by mainly providing resupply, interdiction, and CAS.   The consequences of this 
inter-branch competition were that US intelligence failed to locate the PVA contingents 
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within North Korea.  FEAF was either providing fire support to ground troops who also 
were not aware of Chinese presence, or it was pushing for a bombing campaign on the 
cities and bridges in northern Korea.   
Throughout the war, the three main branches of the US military squabbled over 
target selection - identifying and prioritizing enemy targets according to value and threat.  
This terminology rose to prominence with the formation of the Joint Strategic Plans and 
Operations Group, which consisted of representatives from each branch of the US 
military.
 42
  Its purpose was to coordinate and delineate the areas of responsibility.  FEAF 
was essentially being pulled apart from three different directions since there were not 
enough planes in the Korean theatre to meet the needs of the entire military.  And the 
main source of friction was that MacArthur’s High Command wanted to direct FEAF 
from Tokyo instead of allowing regional commanders to make decisions in Korea.
43
  
There was a heavy bias for air-to-ground targets to assist the army’s advance into North 
Korea.  FEAF increasingly felt the pressure to replicate its unique contribution to the UN 
effort in Korea.   It needed to prove that the Truman Administration’s funding was not for 
naught.   
Underestimating China’s will to spend bodies  
  So far, this thesis has only examined the interrelationship between the willingness 
to spend dollars and military technology.  However, what if a nation were completely 
willing to spend bodies to fight a war?  How would the willingness to sacrifice soldiers’ 
lives affect military technology?  On the other hand, how could advanced military 
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technology affect a nation’s willingness to spend bodies?  The Chairman of the newly 
formed People’s Republic of China (PRC), Mao Zedong, was perfectly willing to spend 
bodies rather than dollars to fight the advancing UN troops in northern Korea.  The 
fighting style of the Chinese military reflected their nation’s economic and demographic 
realities of being undeveloped, agrarian, and massive in population size.  These 
characteristics were the complete opposite of those of America’s industrialized society.   
The first contingents of the PVA lacked heavy weaponry but could traverse 
Korea’s difficult terrain.  The average Chinese soldier in Korea did not have vehicular 
transport, adequate artillery support, or sufficient air cover.  Most of the small arms used 
by the PVA consisted of old Chinese, Russian, and United States equipment.
44
  How did 
the PVA mitigate their technological disadvantage?  First, the Chinese had the advantage 
of fighting so close to home.  With the UN troops nearing the Chinese border, the 
Chinese politburo galvanized the populace and its soldiers to defend their homeland from 
foreign invaders.  Secondly, in stark contrast to their American opponents, the one of the 
core values of the PVA was based on Mao Zedong’s firm belief that the energies of the 
people will prevail over any formidable weaponry.  He thus asked: if one resisted with 
“this [human] spirit, what enemy can we [sic] not conquer and who can say that ultimate 
victory will not be ours?”45  Mao felt that his previous fighting experience against the 
Japanese and the Nationalist Chinese validated his belief in the strength of the human 
spirit to overcome all odds.  His forces were constantly outnumbered and outgunned 
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throughout the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and the Chinese Civil War 
(1945-1949).  Yet Mao and his commanders ultimately prevailed. 
The Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) displayed their immense tenacity to go toe 
to toe with a modern, mechanized army throughout the entire Korean War.  The main 
component of Mao’s military strategy was his willingness to accept high casualties.  He 
understood that it was ultimately the US public that would decide how long the war was 
going to last.  It is fair to say that will power went beyond the ability of those who were 
fighting.  A war of attrition cannot be won by technology alone.  Accurately explained by 
Fehrenbach, the Korean War proved to Americans that “you may fly over a land forever; 
you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life – but if you desire to 
defend it, protect it… you must do this on the ground.” 46  Therefore, a military victory 
requires popular support for a prolonged war, especially in a democratic society.   
The Chinese resupplied their troops by utilizing their abundant manpower.  
Thousands of laborers and pack animals carried the necessary supplies to sustain an 
offensive against US troops.  By sacrificing speed and a steady supply flow offered by 
technology, PVA logistics could move undetected and traverse the mountainous terrain, 
which was inaccessible to a mechanized, road-bound army.  The Chinese logistical 
system ensured that multiple routes were available in case one was attacked.  They used 
the “so-called delivery forward principle used by the Soviets in World War II,” which 
consisted of a top-down supply chain where the higher unit was responsible for supplying 
the lower unit.
47
  Although UN air superiority virtually halted Chinese military and 
logistical movement during the day, it lost its effectiveness during the night because few 
                                                 
46
 T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study of Unpreparedness (New York: Pocket Books, INC, 1964), 
454. 
47
 Mark. Aerial Interdiction, 307. 
28 
 
Chinese vehicles would be driven with lights on.  Despite UN air power reducing the 
movement of supplies, Chinese logistics were never entirely cut by interdiction from the 
air because of the Chinese practice of strict light and noise discipline along with effective 
camouflage.   
How successful were the PVA in deceiving US intelligence of its presence in 
North Korea?  Following a style of warfare that accepted high casualties, what were the 
strategies or methods employed by the PVA to neutralize superior US military 
technology?  Before delving into specifics, it is essential to understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Chinese peasant soldier.  Chinese soldiers were most effective as light 
troops, whose role specialized in reconnaissance and quick maneuvers, which 
“demonstrated that [they] were well trained disciplined fire fighters, and particularly 
adept at night fighting… Their patrols were remarkably successful in locating the 
positions of the U.N. [sic] forces.”48  In his research on light infantry, Army Major Scott 
R. McMichael included an examination of the PVA during the Korean War.  He went 
beyond the stealth and infiltration and shed special attention on how the superior physical 
conditioning and stamina of Chinese soldiers allowed them not only to survive the harsh 
elements and lack of supplies but also to keep up with the pace of a mechanized army.
49
  
Ironically, the tough Chinese peasant solider displayed a high level of self-reliance, a 
virtue that is traditionally portrayed as a unique part of American culture.      
Cultural and historical ignorance  
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The reliance on military technology also encouraged US troops to be culturally 
and historically ignorant of East Asia, which affected their ability to work with their 
South Korean allies and consequently allowed the PVA a decisive advantage at the 
beginning of the Chinese intervention.  American soldiers and the higher command 
looked down on the South Koreans, showed their ignorance on East Asian geopolitics, 
and underestimated China’s military capability.  The poor performance of the ROK army 
early in the war gave General MacArthur and his commanders some justification to view 
their allies with some contempt.  In his interviews with war veterans, the historian 
Appleman wrote about how one observer complained, “The Koreans haven’t had time to 
learn our Army technique.  An American doughboy hated to have his life dependent on 
whether his Oriental buddy” would react properly under enemy fire.50   
Although the most experienced ROK general, Paik Sun Yup, reported to his 
American superiors as early as mid-October that Chinese troops were operating in North 
Korea, General MacArthur’s command ignored and discounted his observations.  Yet on 
October 28, 1950, there were multiple reports “that a large force of Chinese troops had 
come into North Korea,” and US military advisors “were skeptical… of the radio 
report…” and thereby considered it “scare treatment.”51  However, US Army officials 
“[concede] the possibility that a token force of Chinese communists… may be 
somewhere in North Korea,” but that it was not large enough to warrant any concerns.52  
This statement contrasted sharply with the October 27 Associated Press report about how 
“General Paik Sun Yup, commander of the Republican First Division, was quoted 
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officially as saying that the three enemy regiments fighting his division were Chinese 
communists.”53  In his memoirs, General Paik Sun Yup, who spoke fluent Chinese, 
personally interrogated a Chinese POW.  He wrote: “the Chinese prisoner [gave] the most 
shocking news I had heard since the war began… I lost no time in contacting my corps 
commander, Major General Milburn.”54  After the interrogation, “General Milburn 
reported these facts through Eighth Army to Charles Willoughby, General MacArthur’s 
deputy chief of staff for intelligence… however, General MacArthur’s headquarters 
held… an optimistic view… and decided the interrogation… was an anomaly. I had no 
other Chinese Army POW I could trot out to challenge the conclusion of the UN 
command.”55    
Historians differ on who was to blame for the UN intelligence failure.  Some 
attribute it to the US ground commanders; others fault MacArthur himself or Charles 
Willoughby.
56
  But racism towards Asians probably played a large role in dismissing 
General Paik’s reports.  The historian Bruce Cumings revealed how the British journalist, 
Reginald Thompson, “was appalled by the ubiquitous, casual racism of Americans, from 
general to soldier, and their breathtaking ignorance of Korea.”57  Referring to Donald 
Knox’s work on the oral histories of the Korean War, Cumings mentioned that American 
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soldiers considered the South Koreans cowardly and unreliable.
58
  New York Times 
reporter Hanson Baldwin also mentioned how “[t]he South Koreans exaggerate and are 
unreliable in their reports, and if the going gets too tough they may melt away.”59  
American commanders agreed with Baldwin’s assessment. 
The superiority of technology, tinged with subtle racism, let the US troops and 
commanders forget what was at stake, as in a New York Times reporter’s critique of US 
foreign policy from the war front on October 31, 1950.  The author argued for a “far 
closer liaison between military and foreign policy and improved intelligence services, and 
the necessity for a clearer understanding of Asian psychology, are among the high-level 
lessons taught by the Korean War.” 60  The reporter masterfully brought into question the 
American method of waging war when he condemned the “prophets of the easy way out 
and of the soft life had lulled even many of our military men into a complacency that 
guided us into erroneous beliefs.” 61  He further shed light on how American bias and 
assumptions were essentially hamstringing US efforts in the war: 
“the enemy usually knew what we were doing but too often we did not 
know what he was doing.   The great need for more linguists trained in 
oriental languages and dialects also was emphasized.  But perhaps one of 
the basic reasons for inadequate intelligence in Korea was the American 
lack of understanding of the Asian and of the oriental mind.  We tended… 
to look down upon the Koreans as an inferior race.  It was with this 
attitude of patronizing contempt that we went into action in Korea.  We 
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quickly discovered that the ‘gook’ was a tough soldier.”  “More 
knowledge of Asian psychology… would have provided a framework into 
which we could have fitted what often seemed completely illogical actions 
on the part of the enemy.” 62 
 
In another one of his articles, Hanson Baldwin stated that the “peninsular 
geography of Korea favored our [US] efforts to cut enemy communications and aid our 
sea and air power.”63  In the early days of the war, the US military capabilities appeared 
to support Baldwin’s statement.  But nobody on the US side seemed to take into 
consideration the geopolitical history of Korea and China.  Traditionally, Chinese and 
Korean relations had been characterized by a Confucian relationship where ‘big brother’ 
China looked after ‘little brother’ Korea.  The Korean Peninsula had always acted as a 
security buffer for the Chinese against foreign invasion.  And China effectively utilized 
geopolitical history to justify its intervention to the international stage.  In a special news 
release on November 12, Beijing dispelled US assumptions that the Chinese motives for 
intervening on behalf of the DPRK were purely economic.  The Chinese spokesperson 
reveled that “the presence of United States troops in Korea constituted a threat to Red 
China’s [sic] security.”64  China essentially won the propaganda war when it cited 
historical ties of security interest by stating that, “the Korean people… not only 
participated in the war of liberation but also in the anti-Northern expedition of 1925-27, 
in the land reform war of 1927-37 and in the anti-Japanese war of 1927-45.”65  This 
statement was difficult to rebut because it was drawing the line between truth and myth.  
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Regardless of whether it was right or wrong for the Chinese to intervene, the historical 
statement at the time was difficult for Western critics to rebut. 
The total disregard of cultural differences and historical context was a major 
disadvantage for MacArthur and his UN command.  Many US decision makers falsely 
believed that a superior, modern military could handle any resistance from a backward, 
undeveloped Asian one.  Defeating the Japanese Empire during the Second World War 
bolstered this condescending mentality towards Asians.  The US military valued 
“firepower over manpower,” which did provide undeniably numerous advantages on the 
battlefield.  Yet it was evident that when used improperly, the foundations of American 
battlefield advantage would crumble if these weapons were put out of action.  Roy 
Appleman along with numerous historians would often cite a captured Chinese army 
pamphlet, Primary Conclusions of Battle Experiences at Unsan, as a document that 
revealed the strength and weaknesses of a technologically reliant military.  The Chinese 
acknowledged that the American  
“artillery is very active. … Aircraft strafing and bombing of our 
transportation have become a great hazard to us… Their infantry rate of 
fire is great…”  Yet, they highlight that American soldiers “…depend on 
their planes, tanks, and artillery… They specialize in day fighting.  They 
are not familiar with night fighting or hand to hand combat… If defeated, 
they have no orderly formation… They are afraid when the rear is cut off.  
When transportation comes to a standstill, the infantry loses the will to 
fight.”66 
 
Quantification of Warfare 
  The final paradox from the will/technology relationship is that quantifying war 
created unrealistic expectations of the entire US war effort in Korea.  Developing military 
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technology needs investment, which the Truman Administration was more than willing to 
make.  The sign of a successful investment in anything can only be measured by the 
quantifiable results.  US officials moved away from the abstract notions of war and 
brought in some hard evidence, which could be seen as equivalent to the US effort to 
bring some clarity and certainty in the messy business of war.  The New York Times 
published a statement from General MacArthur’s headquarters to show how successful 
UN forces had been in North Korea.  Essentially, the military quantified war for the 
audience by writing how FEAF “[claimed a total] nine tanks, ninety-one vehicles, three 
locomotives, twenty-two gun positions, seven supply dumps and seventy-seven supply or 
fortified buildings destroyed or damaged.”67 
Production and, to a certain degree, destruction are quantified so that 
policymakers and the average citizen can determine the progress of US effort in a 
conflict.  It is easier to show numbers to the public as evidence of progress, which in turn 
sustains the public support of US involvement in foreign regional conflicts.  Progress is 
equated to success, which can only be measured in miles gained or damage to the 
opponent.  The Korean War was no exception.  The biggest take-away from analyzing 
government and military attraction to technology was the gradual rationalization of 
combat into quantitative figures.  The grittiness and progress of ground warfare were 
measured by miles, but aerial combat, as a proxy for the effectiveness of technology, 
provided the number of enemies destroyed in relation to expenditure or the quantity of 
bombs dropped.  For example, FEAF dropped “a total of 40,000 incendiaries in eleven 
                                                 
67
 “The Korean War: HEAVY AIR BLOWS RAINED ON KOREA AS ALLIED GROUND FORCES 
FORGE AHEAD List of Casualties,” The New York Times, November 9, 1950, 2. Proquest Historical 
Newspapers (111712314). 
35 
 
minutes.”68  Positive quantified results, whether deceptive or not, created myopia for both 
the military command and the American public to measure the standards of success; and 
the Administration funneled itself into a narrow, simplified view towards war.   
The promise and peril of military technology, accompanied by the will to spend 
money or lives, were vividly displayed during the Korean War.  The will to spend dollars 
led to the reliance on technology, which, in turn, justified the will to spend dollars.  
Technology greatly mitigated the problem of “being overstretched” not only on the 
battlefield but also on the world stage, which allowed the Truman Administration to 
fulfill its containment policy.  In the case of the Korean War, airplanes and jet-propelled 
aircraft best represented the technological innovations developed by the US military.  Air 
power created advantages for US forces on and off the battlefield.  The US could 
simultaneously expand and defend its hegemony in East Asia without mobilizing the 
entire country and committing a substantial number of its citizens to fight abroad.  By 
providing a relatively easy and cheap victory during the early months of the Korean War, 
air power ultimately increased the American public’s tolerance towards US military 
involvement in regional conflicts.  However, the Chinese intervention in late 1950 
revealed the unresolved contest of technology against the will to spend lives; in the end, 
technology was not the panacea for the intricate challenges of regional conflicts. 
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Will and Politics 
Although the Administration enjoyed political leeway by choosing to spend 
money over lives, President Truman faced divided domestic and foreign policy goals.  
Was the increase in defense expenditure to gain domestic votes or to strengthen and 
maintain American international influence?  At one time, it looked as if Truman would 
have achieved both goals.  Funding the war allowed the US to project its influence in 
East Asia while bringing military victory with minimal ground commitment; he could 
make the Korean War popular at home and enjoy the validation of his containment 
policy.  However, the possible threat of a Chinese intervention loomed in the minds of 
military and civilian leaders in Washington.  Air power soon emerged as a solution for 
the Truman Administration because of a combination of hubris, a fixation on absolute 
victory, and a lack of consensus among policymakers and politicians.  Instead of heeding 
British advice to establish a buffer zone and consolidate UN gains, the US pursued an air 
campaign to bomb bridges across the Yalu with high hopes to secure the Korean frontier 
from China.   
At the height of the UN’s success in Korea around late October and early 
November 1950, the US government had to contend with conflicting political objectives.  
As the leader of the free, capitalist world, the Truman Administration wanted not only to 
reduce the military and financial burdens of protecting Korea but also to deal with the 
rise of the Soviet Union as a new threat to American global interests.  In addition, the US 
also had to contend with the British and the French, who had a tense relationship with the 
US and resented being used to fulfill US foreign policy.  As American troops comprised 
the majority of UN ground forces, President Truman and his cabinet could more or less 
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shape the UN agenda in Korea to fulfill US interests.  Yet the Administration as well as 
MacArthur needed other democratic nations participating in the war to uphold an air of 
international legitimacy for military action.  While the defense of South Korea provided a 
common cause for all UN nations to follow, crossing the 38
th
 Parallel proved to be a 
different matter.  The Administration’s priority towards avoiding general war in Korea 
went as far back as September 9, 1950.  The declassified document, NSC Council 81/1,
69
 
shows that the US supported the UN’s political objective of uniting Korea.  However, 
NSC 81/1 also stated the importance of confining initial military action below the 38
th
 
Parallel and asserted that if there was indeed a need to extend UN operations north, then 
the majority of the UN participants must agree because a “stalemate freezing the U.N. 
forces indefinitely in Korea… would be undesirable.”70   But in little over a month, US 
foreign policymakers experienced the consequences when they mistakenly equated US 
international interest with that of its allies.   
The British Proposal of Cordon Sanitaire: An Appeasement?   
On November 13, 1950, the British Ambassador to the United States, Sir Oliver 
Franks, passed a classified message written by the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest 
Bevin, to the US Department of State expressing wariness toward the possibility of a 
Chinese intervention in Korea.  Bevin argued for an alternative approach to dealing with 
the threat of Chinese intervention while hoping to steer the UN away from overt military 
action and more towards reinforcing its political and diplomatic legitimacy.  The most 
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notable point of Bevin’s proposal was to establish a demilitarized area or a cordon 
sanitaire, which would require UN troops to abandon all territory north of Chongju and 
Hungnam.
71
  Below is a map with two notable characteristics: The dark shades represent 
high elevations (above 200 meters) covering most of northern Korea; and the black  
 
Map 2 
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dashed line is the would-be buffer zone if Bevin’s proposal was followed.72 
Bevin cited political and fiscal benefits of such an action because it would end the 
war sooner and “thus liquidating a costly military commitment, but also satisfying the 
Chinese that the United Nations have no aggressive intent against Manchuria.”73  The 
British Foreign Secretary even went so far as to outline the strategic benefits of a UN 
withdrawal in case of military confrontation.  In doing so, he addressed the limitations of 
air power.  Map 2 further confirms Bevin’s contention that a solid UN front running from 
Chongju to Hungnam offered a defensible perimeter – one that is shorter than the Korean 
frontier.  By stopping the advance, the UN forces not only could consolidate their gains 
and strengthen the depth of their frontline but also would gain political leverage over the 
Chinese.  Although there was no guarantee that Beijing would have honored its pledge of 
not becoming involved in Korea, an attack on a stabilized UN line of resistance that was 
relatively far away from the Manchurian border would have portrayed the PRC as the 
unjustified aggressor.  Bevin warned that if UN forces continued to advance to the 
frontier, its advantage in air power will be neutralized since the area of operations would 
violate Chinese territory.
74
  Bevin seemed to have a better grasp of the geopolitical 
situation in Korea when he stated the following: “(3) It is doubtful whether, without 
striking at air targets in Manchuria, General MacArthur has sufficient forces to fight his 
way to the North Korean frontier and maintain himself there once he reaches it.”75  While 
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acknowledging the decisive advantages provided by air power, the British also 
understood the limitations of UN military capability to resist a Chinese intervention.    
Unfortunately, Secretary Acheson and General MacArthur disagreed with Bevin’s 
alternative proposal.  MacArthur interpreted the proposal as a “British desire to appease 
the Chinese Communists” and mentioned the oft-cited European inaction at Munich and 
German occupation of the Sudeten Lands in 1938.
76
  Acheson also argued, in his 
response to Bevin on November 24, that the UN should not establish a cordon sanitaire 
but instead continue with current military operations in North Korea.  He cited a variety 
of reasons ranging from diplomatic interests to troop morale to operational issues.  
Strangely, his main reason was that MacArthur already began his offensive and any order 
of ‘retreat’ would hurt US troop morale.  Then, he clearly demonstrated America’s 
political power in the UN when he reminded Bevin that everyone must be sensitive to the 
“public opinion in the US which [had] furnished the great bulk of the troops.”77  He was 
essentially masking American unilateral action as multilateral intentions as he stated that, 
“we are all trying to do the same thing … to bring about the end of the fighting” and 
“keep western forces away from direct contact with Chi [Chinese]… forces at the Korea 
frontier.”78  MacArthur was convinced that any proposal that would alter the current 
course of American-led action could be disastrous.  The classified telegrams between 
Bevin and Acheson on November 13 and 24 were quintessential examples demonstrating 
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the messy relationship between the will to spend dollars and US domestic and 
international politics.      
A China expert: A Lone Voice Raising Alarms   
O. Edmund Clubb, the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, was a China 
expert for the State Department.  He had officially confirmed that the Chinese 
Communist Forces (CCF) were present in North Korea and inferred that they were acting 
as an independent contingent from DPRK forces since November 1.
79
  Clubb also noted 
that the PRC had opted for direct intervention and that US/UN forces needed to reassess 
their military situation north of the 38
th
 Parallel.  Both Truman and MacArthur previously 
admitted that the US did not possess the resources to combat a direct Chinese 
intervention and therefore agreed to halt any advance once contact was made with any 
elements of the CCF.  Yet the UN Command and US foreign policy officials disregarded 
such cautions and arrangements, which could have prevented America’s involvement in a 
protracted war. 
Clubb seemed to favor the British proposal, focusing more on the political and 
diplomatic avenues to gain time to understand communist aims.
80
  MacArthur and 
Acheson did not like his assessments and recommendations for the “temporary 
abandonment of an all-out offensive in favor of more wary tactics… to permit political 
estimates and discussions with our allies, to the end that, in our haste to win a battle, we 
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shall not lose the war.”81  Yet Clubb astutely observed that “[i]t is hard to believe that, in 
the event of war… we shall be able to avoid certain military defeats of serious nature for 
the UN side.”82  Most importantly, he believed that political detente with the Chinese did 
not equate to appeasement but rather created political avenues to contain hostilities within 
Korea.
83
  Unlike many of his contemporaries, he did not catch victory fever and 
constantly advised his superiors that the Administration’s foreign policy should maintain 
political support for the war.  As mentioned earlier in the thesis, President Truman 
needed the political and military support of friendly nations; and the US needed to stay 
within the agreed UN framework.  Clubb wisely warned: “we should not assume… that 
our will is the UN will… We cannot go faster than the UN, or we shall find ourselves 
alone.”84  In hindsight, Bevin and Clubb were correct in their assessments and 
recommendations of cautious action.  Overall, these debates show how the US tried to 
grapple with alternative solutions in the face of Cold War politics and an outdated 
military strategy: what was once clear became obscure. 
The Impending Chinese Intervention: Key Intelligence Reports Lost 
By compiling and collecting various Army intelligence reports, I found a clear 
trajectory of growing Chinese presence in northern Korea (See Fig. 1 below).  I read and 
collected the various military intelligence reports regarding aerial observation, 
skirmishes, and the collection of prisoners of war.  The numbers show the gradual 
increase in US estimations that should have raised red flags for the JCS and the UN 
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Command.  Yet no immediate action was taken.  The reality in Korea collided with 
Acheson and MacArthur’s assertion that the improved conditions in Korea did not 
warrant a cordon sanitaire.   
The statistics in Fig. 1 show the probability of the Chinese intervention as Bevin 
accurately observed it.  Bevin attempted to bridge Anglo-American interests by avoiding 
open hostilities with China.  He wrote: “It is of great importance to establish 
*
 
  Fig. 1 
 
the military significance of Chinese intervention.”  Bevin had a more realistic approach to 
the ongoing situation in Korea as he acknowledged America’s condemnation of a 
Chinese intervention, yet he still insisted that the UN must “[r]ecognise [sic] Chinese 
                                                 
*
 Although the size of army units vary, a regiment usually contain up to 4,5000 personnel 
Date CCF Numbers
10/27/1950 2 Divisions (Not Independent)
10/28/1950 1 regiment* 
29-Oct 2,000 Troops
30-Oct 2 regiments
31-Oct 2,000 Troops
31-Oct 5,000 Troops
31-Oct 133,000 Troops 
11/1/1950 2 to 3 regiments (Independent)
1-Nov 15,000 - 20,000 Troops
2-Nov 2 regiments
3-Nov X>18,000 Troops
7-Nov 100,000 - 133,000 Troops
8-Nov 30,000-40,000 Troops
28-Nov 101,000 Troops
30-Nov 200,000 Troops
U.S. Estimates of Chinese Communist Forces 
Troop Levels
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interests in the ultimate settlement of Korea.”85  He perceptively understood that the PRC 
would be an unavoidable power in East Asia.  Rather than focusing on territorial 
acquisition, Bevin believed that the UN objective at this point should be to build up troop 
forces in case a Chinese counteroffensive indeed took place. 
While British caution did raise eyebrows in Washington, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) seemed to be the only American intelligence organization that seriously 
considered Chinese regional interests.  The CIA drew similar conclusions in its 
assessment of a Chinese intervention.  Walter B. Smith, Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, informed the President on November 1, 1950 of troop estimates, 
predictions of Chinese regional motives, and possible political objectives.  The 
significance of Smith’s memo to Truman is that it concurred with conclusions by 
Director Clubb and Bevin.  Smith assessed that China’s main motivation was to establish 
a limited cordon sanitaire below the Yalu River because it genuinely feared an invasion 
by UN forces.
86
  The CIA report was supported by another draft memo written by Mr. 
John P. Davies of the Policy Planning Staff.  This top-secret document considered all 
possible scenarios concerning an intervention but underscored the fact that the US did not 
have the resources or the political capital to combat the Chinese indefinitely.  Because the 
US was the “moving spirit in the UN,” Beijing would rebuff Truman’s assurances.  
Davies acutely stated that Beijing’s antipathy towards the US was not necessarily out of 
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political ideology but rather stemmed from its experience during the Chinese Civil War 
(1945-1949) and then the current issues with Formosa.
87
 
In its official memorandum dated on November 8, the CIA provided an official 
estimate of CCF forces in Korea from data supplied by the State Department, the Army, 
the Navy, and the Air Force.  It concluded that roughly 30,000-40,000 CCF were in 
North Korea while another 700,000 were based in Manchuria.  The CIA believed that 
China was fully capable of halting the UN advance and marching over to Korea.
 88
 
Essentially, the PRC was perfectly willing to spend money and lives to obtain realistic, 
limited objectives as its military retained “full freedom of action with respect to Korea.”89  
Beijing was unified politically and militarily and, unlike their American counterparts, had 
wholeheartedly accepted the risk of becoming involved in an expanded conventional war.  
The Chinese possessed the will to sacrifice the lives of its soldiers to protect their 
nation’s sovereignty at any cost. 
Absolute Victory: an American Penchant   
Despite their wariness towards the Chinese intervention, the JCS allowed 
MacArthur to continue his advance because everyone was hopeful that the USAF would 
successfully interdict Chinese supply lines.  On November 6, 1950, the JCS agreed with a 
strategic bombing campaign of the Yalu bridges in order to isolate the battlefield in North 
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Korea.  US interests in Korea then started to contradict each other.  Originally, NSC 81/1 
dated in September 1950 provided explicit instructions that MacArthur “should undertake 
no ground operations north of the 38
th
 parallel in the event of the occupation of North 
Korea by… Chinese Communist forces.”90 
MacArthur’s objectives were also altered to destroy the remnants of the NKPA 
and conquer all North Korean territory for the ROK.  MacArthur sent another secret 
update to the JCS the next day (November 7) to explain his intentions for the UN 
military.  He admitted that independent, organized Chinese military contingents were 
fighting back the UN advance, but he argued that UN forces should resume its advance 
because “[o]nly through such an offensive effort can any accurate measure be taken of 
enemy strength.”91  Finally, MacArthur tried to minimize the danger of direct Chinese 
intervention by stating that “bombing of [enemy] targets [was] the only resource left to 
me to prevent a potential buildup of enemy strength.”92  Air power was the key 
component to MacArthur’s confidence in preventing Chinese interference in Korea. 
For historians, a central question remains: why did American leaders believe it 
was necessary to use a strained military force for territorial acquisition while risking a 
war with China?  Why did they downplay the British proposal, battlefield intelligence, 
the internal warnings such as Clubb’s, and the CIA assessments?  The most plausible 
answer stems from US military doctrine of absolute victory.  MacArthur eloquently 
expressed this doctrine: he believed that retreat or anything short of total victory was 
                                                 
90
 “National Security Council Report, NSC 81/1, “United States Courses of Action with Respect to 
Korea”,” September 09, 1950, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116194 (accessed August 
25, 2013). 
91
 MacArthur to JCS, “The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” in U.S. 
Department of State, FRUS, 1950. vol. VII: 1077, 
http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.forrel/frusht0059&id=745&collection=forrel&index=fo
rrel/frusht#1091. 
92
 FRUS, 1950. vol. VII: 1077.  
47 
 
encouraging communist aggression, which would be “the greatest defeat of the free world 
in recent times… bankrupt our… influence in Asia,” and therefore he recommended that 
“we press on to complete victory.”93  To leaders like Acheson and MacArthur, terms such 
as “withdrawal” and “demilitarize” went against the doctrine of advance, maneuver, and 
firepower, which were the foundations of the American style of warfare.  The historian 
Russell F. Weigley provides insight into MacArthur’s obsession with offensive action 
and absolute victory.  Weigley argues that the American military and political 
establishment possesses a rudimentary understanding of what constituted as a Civil War-
era victory.  He believes that US military strategy hinged on the single goal of “the 
complete overthrow of the enemy, the destruction of his military power, [as] the object of 
war.”94  The military experience developed during the Second World War was ill fitting 
for Cold War views toward military conflict because limited war was inconsistent with 
the goal of unconditional surrender.
95
  
When it was clear that MacArthur intended to cross the 38th Parallel, the 
relationship between politics and the will to spend dollars took center stage.  The will to 
invest in military technology rather than lives allowed President Truman not only to keep 
a regional war popular with his constituents but also to solidify US prestige and influence 
as the biggest contributor to UN efforts.  Ironically, Truman became a victim of his own 
success in many ways: the American public, enamored by the string of UN victories in 
September and October, expected US forces to achieve a quick and absolute victory; his 
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officials aligned themselves with MacArthur on the faith in air power while ignoring 
other viable policy options recommended; and key intelligence reports on the impending 
Chinese intervention were brushed away.  Internationally, many European allies, 
especially the British, disagreed and questioned the decisions made by the American 
leadership.  As the diplomatic complexities rose, the US lost sight of its original 
priority—avoiding a protracted war—and, naturally and understandably, clung to what 
was familiar and comfortable: its belief in modern technology and the Cold War 
accusation of appeasement against its detractors. 
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Politics and Technology 
The interrelations between politics and military technology began to play a 
prominent role when the Chinese, after months of silent observation, finally sprung their 
trap on the UN troops.  On the first days of November 1950, a force of 20-30,000 
Chinese soldiers mauled the US Eighth cavalry and the 15th ROK regiments that recently 
captured Unsan, a small town in Northeast Korea.  Fighter-bombers of the USAF 
supported the initial defense of Unsan but darkness soon neutralized this technological 
advantage.  With air support unable to provide relief and only a single main road coming 
out of the town, retreating American forces were soon cut off by roadblocks set up by 
infiltrating Chinese troops.  Heavy reliance on motor transport proved to be a blessing 
and a curse for the soldiers of the Eighth cavalry.  The Chinese troops in surrounding 
hillside would halt the lead vehicle, which then stalled all the ones behind it. Without 
alternative routes, American transports and heavy equipment were easily eliminated.  
Many scholars regard the Battle of Unsan as the worst defeat of US forces in Korea.  
According to historian David Halberstam, this elite American regiment lost half of its 
authorized strength and its spokesperson described the battle as “‘a massacre… like the 
one that hit Custer at the Little Big Horn.’”96 
The map below describes the sequence of events during the Battle of Unsan.
97
  
The dotted lines coming out of Unsan are roads in the mountainous terrain.  The CCF 
infiltrated US lines and quickly surrounded the 8
th
 Cavalry, cutting the avenues of escape 
by setting up road blocks.  The sudden defeat was a rude awakening to American troops 
on the ground. 
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Map 3 
Many of the senior commanders of the Eighth Army interpreted the battle as a Chinese 
warning to stay away from the border.  Yet MacArthur regarded Unsan as a minor 
setback as he did a week earlier in October when a similar Chinese force demolished a 
couple of ROK regiments.
98
  The General’s view reflected a deeper problem within the 
American military command structure and his relationship with the decision makers in 
Washington.  The JCS had to balance politics and military interests, but his view was 
solely based on a military perspective.  The JCS was responsible for controlling and 
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dictating policy matters regarding the Korean War to General MacArthur and his forces 
on the ground.  But when there was no subsequent Chinese offensive after November 2, 
MacArthur wished to resume his offensive towards the Yalu and “withdraw the Eighth 
Army to Japan by Christmas.”99  Around November 6, 1950, the PVA that defeated the 
US and ROK regiments at Unsan disappeared.  Convinced that the sudden attack was all 
the Chinese could muster, MacArthur ordered his forces to continue the advance while 
the USAF and its allies bombed roads and bridges along the Yalu River to isolate the 
battlefield.  But then he would leave himself the only possible military option: to enter 
Manchuria if the Chinese survived the US air campaign and forcefully responded to his 
northward advance.  America and its allies were not prepared to sacrifice the military and 
political capital necessary for an expanded war in Northeast China.  Politically, the US 
was already being labeled as the aggressor by the Chinese while at the same time it was 
alienating its own allies. 
The Limitations of Air Power 
The US justified UN action against communist aggression by citing morality and 
democratic principles.  American technological strength steered the war aims of this 
multinational army at whim.  When the Korean War reached a crucial point, the JCS 
indulged MacArthur’s confidence on air power and allowed the General to continue his 
risky advance toward the Manchurian border.  Although reliance on air power was not 
wholly shared by his colleagues, MacArthur’s overall sentiments trickled down to the 
lower ranks in the US Army, which led to careless military action on the ground and an 
obsession for offensive maneuvers to achieve victory. 
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MacArthur’s forces had enormous trouble gauging the exact size of the PVA 
operating in Korea.  The harsh winter weather and Korea’s mountainous terrain greatly 
hindered aerial observation of already deceptive PVA forces with camouflage and 
discipline.  Lacking the proper equipment for photo analysis, US intelligence had no 
choice but to turn to the interrogation reports of captured Chinese prisoners.  Newspapers 
as well as secret US government documents cited complaints of bad weather and rough 
terrain being the main causes of not knowing where the PVA were.  The American 
Ambassador to Korea, John Muccio, highlighted the limitations of air power as he 
reported to Secretary Acheson that “aerial reconnaissance last night [was] hampered by 
poor weather”100 and that “[p]oor visibility hindered air operations… including 
reconnaissance.”101  MacArthur complained about the terrain in his message to the JCS 
by saying that the Korean terrain and the international boundary were major factors in 
“[diminishing] the effectiveness of our air support in channelizing and interrupting the 
enemy supply system; [they serve] to aid the enemy in his dispersion tactics.”102 
Weeks after the Battle of Unsan, UN forces launched their “Home-by-Christmas 
Offensive,” MacArthur’s one last push before complete victory.  However, the PVA 
immediately attacked and decimated ROK units, which split the UN front in half and 
forced a total retreat.  MacArthur stumbled into another Chinese attack followed by a 
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major counteroffensive because US technological advantage encouraged him to adopt an 
offensive strategy when actually a more nuanced approach was needed.  Territorial 
acquisition was the phrase MacArthur and his command often used to justify the UN 
offensive in October, which also reflected the American public’s quantified interpretation 
of military progress.  Although there were surviving remnants of the NKPA and the 
North Korean political leadership, it was unclear how occupying territory up to the Sino-
Korean border would fulfill immediate US interests in keeping the war as a localized 
conflict.  As Clausewitz famously said, “[d]estruction of the enemy’s force is only a 
means to an end, a secondary matter… as a rule a hill or a bridge is captured only so that 
even more damage can be inflicted on the enemy.”103 Therefore, it is not surprising that 
China would be apprehensive if a foreign military force encroached on its territory.  
Nonetheless, the JCS gave MacArthur permission to engage enemy forces north of the 
38
th
 Parallel and to halt only when he believed that he could not win against the Chinese 
military.  And Acheson blamed the civilian sector for distorting the General’s 
interpretation of the military directive.
104
  He argued that “we [the JCS] are not interested 
in ‘real estate’ but in an army.”105  The Secretary of State was inconsistent with his 
statement: on the one hand, he argued that the US military was not interested in territorial 
acquisition; on the other, Acheson dismissed the British proposal to withdraw to a more 
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defendable line and solidify UN gains since uniting Korea did not require “the military 
occupation of all of Korea to its northernmost boundaries.”106   
Messy Politics: Hard Reality Colliding with High Expectations 
President Truman had to deal with domestic criticism and efforts of “vilification 
and character assassination” from his Republican opponents while contending with 
MacArthur’s pressure for the green light to resume his November offensive.107  In the 
United States, Truman used the success of the Korean War for his advantage while being 
aware that the American public was extremely sensitive to any more sacrifice in blood 
and money.  When easy victory could not be achieved, the main priority was “to get out 
of Korea as fast as possible” since the American public was disconnected from the 
war.
108
  Civilians cared about televisions and refrigerators, not the Chinese or democracy 
in Korea.   The President also had to contend with the charisma of MacArthur, an almost 
legendary figure who won the Pacific Theatre during World War II, successfully 
reconstructed post-war Japan, and was the first symbol of the Cold War warrior in this 
new conflict.  The Truman Administration would be exposing itself to political attacks 
from the right if it overtly disagreed with MacArthur.   
International politics is, above all else, about power.  The US possessed economic 
and military power in the post-war world: with its technological and industrial strength, 
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Truman projected American influence not only across the Pacific and into East Asia but 
also on its own European allies.  Upon discovering that Secretary Bevin instructed the 
UK representative to the UN, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, to present the proposal of a cordon 
sanitaire, Secretary Acheson sent a top-secret telegram on November 21 to the British 
Embassy, stating that “[w]e [US] have at present no basis for agreement with UK as to 
nature of any demilitarized zone.”109  In short, Acheson gave a flat-out ‘no’ to the 
alternative proposal, which shows the divergence of their policies and the US way of 
dealing with politics and diplomacy. 
Nine days later on November 30, the US Representative to the UN, Warren R. 
Austin, reported to Acheson about what transpired at the UN meeting.  His main concern 
was Jebb’s reaction and comments to the changing situation in Korea.  According to 
Austin, the UK representative believed that the UN Charter was not a suitable instrument 
to handle war against major powers and that regardless of who recognized the PRC, the 
UN was not capable of fighting in a long protracted war against the Chinese military.  
Jebb referred to the original UN mission of reestablishing the status quo in Korea.
110
  The 
UK government was obviously worried that any more commitments to East Asia would 
lower the defenses in Western Europe against potential Soviet aggression.  Austin relayed 
Jebb’s disapproval of American foreign policy when he wrote that other European 
nations and the “UK [share] a tremendous apprehension that US was committing western 
[sic] Europe to conduct war in the Far East… under the most difficult possible strategic 
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conditions.”111  Without an immediate military threat to bind the interests of various 
nations, the US needed to be more sensitive to the opinions of the contributing countries 
and the moral legitimacy of the UN forces. 
By the early months of the Korean War, the days of unquestioned international 
cooperation that shaped during World War II were over as Cold War politics strained 
fragile relations between US and democratic European countries.  Cold War tensions 
were brewing amongst the UN forces, especially between the UK and the US.  Acheson 
and MacArthur brushed away British concerns over overextending military resources and 
antagonizing the Chinese.  They pressured their allies to go along with the American 
agenda.  However, political solidarity was threatened when it was officially confirmed 
that UN forces faced an enemy totaling 200,000.  By early December, it was clear that 
the US lost its gamble after MacArthur reported that “the Chinese Communists continue 
the buildup of their forces in North Korea despite all interdiction of our Air 
Command.”112  The New York Times issued MacArthur’s public statement that the US 
“[faces] an entirely new war.”113  With orders for a full retreat, soldiers reacted 
differently to the turn of events.  When asked why he was fighting in Korea, Marine 
Corporal Frank Bifulk responded: “‘I’m fighting for one thing – me!  Truman really 
slapped us in the face.  He called Korea a police action.  Here we were in Korea fighting 
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and dying and our president says that.  Some thanks.”114  By contrast, Private First Class 
Leonard Korgie was in disbelief as he wondered that “[w]e couldn’t have missed the 
Chinese by much… How come MacArthur did not know China was coming into it [the 
war]?  Where had our Air Force been?
115
  These two soldiers effectively summed up 
what many of their disillusioned comrades felt toward both military and civilian leaders. 
Their disillusionment was another sign of how the JCS had drastically strayed from its 
previous priority of limited war. 
The map below shows how far the UN retreated south to the 38
th
 Parallel.
116
  With 
the Chinese armies unrelenting in their attacks, many UN allies complained that 
American leaders were alienating the very countries crucial to their success in Korea.  
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Rusk, wrote a secret memorandum of 
the November 30 conversation between the European participants, which captured their 
reactions.
117
  Countering MacArthur’s position, Rusk admitted that the Chinese offensive 
had been carefully planned and “was not a result of or in response to the recent UN 
offensive.  UN forces had been out of contact with the enemy for ten days or two 
weeks.”118  Rusk cited Chinese protests and threats of war as the main reason why aerial 
reconnaissance could not find the main concentration of Chinese forces.
119
  He advocated 
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for a multilateral approach to deal with the offensive, which was in stark contrast to 
Acheson’s tone to Foreign Secretary Bevin of the UK a couple weeks before.  
 
Map 4 
 
In response, a handful of UN members were skeptical of US assessments of the current 
situation.  The Australian ambassador, Norman J.O. Makin, wondered why there was a 
disparity between the discovery of large Chinese forces in North Korea and MacArthur’s 
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report that the UN offensive was to be the final phase of the fighting.  The Dutch 
representative, J.G. de Beus, questioned why the UN Commander was caught off guard 
since intelligence channels warned that Beijing was massing “about 160,000 Chinese 
Reds soldiers [sic] in Korea ready to go” several weeks in advance.120  
Besides overestimating the effectiveness of air power, the JCS and UN Command 
plainly refused to heed the warning signs of Chinese presence in Korea.  They believed 
that even if US forces faced a substantial enemy, American technological and cultural 
superiority would suffice to stop any meaningful intervention.  Their refusal was partly 
due to their ignorance of geopolitical realities concerning China and Korea.  Acheson 
refused to heed the advice given by China experts such as Director Clubb of the State 
Department.  Within the military sphere, racial stereotypes toward Asians were rampant.  
MacArthur went beyond the common slurs such as ‘chink’ and ‘gook’; ‘chinaman’ and 
‘laundryman’ as he claimed he understood the “‘mind of the Oriental,’” and believed that 
“the Asiatic respected powerful men who were strong and unshakable in their vision,” 
which conveniently justified overt US military action.
121
  In contrast, the British 
displayed their sensitivity to the geopolitical situation of Sino-Korean history dating back 
to their days of colonial imperialism.  British Ambassador to the US, Sir Oliver Franks, 
mentioned to Acheson that “the entire history of this part of the world indicates a concern 
over Korea as an entrance to Manchuria… the Russians, the Japanese, and the British had 
all had this concept.”122  American leaders had just hoped that the Chinese would not 
react during MacArthur’s November advance. 
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Battling to Hold Coalition Together 
The US had never led other nations on a ‘police action’ in a foreign country prior 
to Korea; and now it was facing trouble when it equated its national policy with that of an 
international organization.  In a JCS meeting at the Pentagon on December 3, 1950, Rusk 
warned that “[u]nless we maintain the integrity of the UN, there is a question if we can 
maintain the integrity of our foreign policy.”123  However, Secretary of Commerce, 
Harriman, reminded everyone that the “UN must consider our [American] moral position 
and American opinion.  Our policy must be based on holding the US and the British 
Commonwealth in line.  The European attitude depends upon us and our attitude and 
what we are ready to do.”124     
In another meeting on December 3, members of the JCS were distraught when 
Acheson reported that “[t]he present tendency among other countries is to criticize us 
rather than the Chinese Communists” after attempting to impose an American style of 
conducting war and politics on an international organization.
125
  According to historian 
Bevin Alexander, both MacArthur and Truman were influenced by the public’s 
“traditional one-dimensional desire for total victory.”126  As a result, the Truman 
Administration unknowingly cornered itself into making extreme decisions laced with 
Cold War anxiety.  Wary of the Soviet Union, Truman rejected the cordon sanitaire 
proposal because an offensive halt may be perceived as military weakness.  While a 
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ceasefire with the Chinese was militarily beneficial, the JCS was not willing to pay the 
political price of humiliation.  The political pendulum in Washington swung from 
confidence in MacArthur’s drive to the Yalu to panicking talks of possible troop 
evacuation and a reemphasis on a Eurocentric policy.  Under Secretary Robert Lovett 
noted that “Korea is not a decisive area for us… Western Europe was our prime concern 
and we would rather see that result [in the loss of Korea and Japan] than lose in Western 
Europe.  It was best to hold in Korea for political motives.”127  
When the PVA neutralized the UN’s air power during the remaining months of 
1950, it limited US foreign policy to being one that oscillated between extremes.  
America’s firm principles were often lauded, but its major weakness was its 
uncompromising politics, which narrowed the options of US foreign policy.  For 
example, Admiral Sherman succinctly stated that “the only sound basis for dealing the 
Chinese Communists would say that unless you stop you are at war with the United 
States… If any one [sic] can kill that many Americans and not be at war, we are 
defeated.”  This style of diplomacy can even be seen in America’s Great Seal as the 
American eagle holds arrows on the right and an olive branch on the left.  Washington’s 
you’re-either-with-us-or-against-us approach did more to sow seeds of discord amongst 
allies rather than to pressure China to relent on their threat to intervene.  According to 
notes taken during a secret JCS meeting, Secretary Acheson opened the discussion by 
informing that UN members were “complaining that the United States’ leadership has 
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failed” and the dire situation is “the fault of General MacArthur’s action.”128  Most 
European nations felt bullied and bitter towards the US because Acheson dismissed allied 
concerns and the British proposal of a demilitarized zone when Chinese troops made 
contact with UN forces back in October. 
The US’s domestic and international politics, which were often contradictory, 
hamstrung its military from wielding enormous technological power.  With Soviet 
presence in Eastern and Central Europe, Washington was determined to continue its 
‘Europe First’ policy.  As a result, it had very limited political capital to support a 
prolonged, inconclusive military action in East Asia.    But then precisely because of the 
promise and supremacy of military technology, the Truman Administration inevitably 
lulled itself into complacencies: inconsistent political and diplomatic priorities, cultural 
and geopolitical ignorance, and unwillingness to bring in its allies.  After air power failed 
to prevent the Chinese intervention, most US policymakers slowly came to realize that 
there were limits to using military power as a rational and effective instrument of foreign 
policy.  In the wake of MacArthur’s appeal to possibly expand the war into Manchuria, 
President Truman could not simply replicate Teddy Roosevelt’s Big Stick Diplomacy to 
persuade China to withdraw from the Korean border, as it was completely willing to risk 
a general war.  Ultimately, politics, war included, was an inconclusive human affair both 
aided and hampered by technology, as far as handling regional conflicts was concerned. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has analyzed the strategy and politics of the US air campaign during a 
three-month period of the Korean War.  I have focused on three factors: will, politics, and 
technology; these intertwined issues are indispensable to analyze the event.  This thesis 
did not insist upon the duality of one issue versus another for understanding the event and 
finding the answers to why the US’s superior military technology could not win against 
the Chinese’s intervention.  Using three paired factors—will/technology, will/politics, 
and politics/technology—with two attributes of each factor, this thesis attempted to 
illuminate the causes and lessons in military strategy between then and now. 
Cultural misperception and economic strength influenced how the US made its 
choice to spend either money or lives in order to achieve its political and military 
objectives.  The United States and China played to their strengths but China was acutely 
aware of the asymmetry—its own limitations and its opponent’s capabilities.  During the 
Korean War, the US faced a rude awakening that technological advantages alone were 
not sufficient in furthering its gains.  In essence, the contest between military technology 
and the will to spend lives remained unresolved. 
Why this was the case is partially due to human frailties: MacArthur and other 
officials had an unquestioning faith in air power and refused to face the new reality by 
ignoring key intelligence reports (non-technology) and other policy options.  Another 
reason why technology was hamstrung is that President Truman struggled to balance 
multiple conflicting interests at home and abroad, as he strove to manage the first “hot 
war” of the Cold War only five years after fighting in the Second World War.  In the US, 
he had to meet the public expectations: not spilling blood and not being “soft on 
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communism”; internationally, he was pulled in different directions: maintaining a 
Eurocentric foreign policy, holding UN countries together, and “having to be there” for 
the strategic importance of East Asia. 
The Vietnam War eclipses the Korean War: the limitations of US military 
technology are usually associated in the context of the former.  But this thesis argues that 
the Korean War is the first regional conflict which exemplifies the challenges that the US 
faces when it involves itself in subsequent far-off conflicts.  The Korean War, 
microscopically the air campaign discussed here, has all the comparable elements that we 
hear in our own time—e.g., “shock and awe,” “combat drones,” and “coalition of the 
willing.”  The threads that run through all the discussions in this thesis are: that there are 
no easy wars; and that those who have an unbridled faith in military technology indulge 
in pipe dreams.  The history of the air campaign, by giving context and examples, 
revealed a very different account: the Korean War severely tested the faith in low-cost 
and decisive war engagements via military technology; it was an asymmetrical war 
between a well-armed military on one side and low-level yet determined opponent on the 
other; decision makers turned a blind eye, in part, to reduce complexities and to protect 
prestige; military action was considered and evaluated based on the critical factor of 
public opinion. 
This thesis still leaves bigger puzzles unanswered: Why do political and military 
leaders seem not to have learned a multitude of lessons from the Korean War?  Why do 
they continue to fight the wrong kinds of battles when military goals are ultimately 
political?  An answer could be our own bias: We pick and choose whatever lessons to suit 
our own ideological agendas and political preferences. 
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